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In 2005, Parliament passed new legislation to regulate railway 
safety in New Zealand. Applying international best practice, 
the Railways Act took a goal-based approach that utilised 
the Safety Case concept as the foundation for regulatory 
oversight. This article describes the Transport Agency’s 
experience in implementing this regulatory approach, 
particularly the Safety Case concept. The change required the 
Transport Agency to first recognise that fully harnessing the 
legislation required a transformational response and then, 
along with the wider industry, address the challenges faced 
in developing and implementing an appropriate regulatory 
operating model 
organisations and staff to make best use of 
their new regulatory tools and skillset. 
As a result, the Transport Agency is 
changing the way it interacts with the 
organisations it regulates, and how it 
measures the success of regulatory 
interventions. Its experiences are not 
unique among the regulatory community 
(New Zealand Productivity Commission, 
2014).
The Railway Story
Railways in New Zealand recently 
celebrated its 150th year – the first public 
railway joined Christchurch to Ferrymead 
in 1863, just 23 years after the signing 
of the Treaty of Waitangi. The railway 
industry has been through peaks and 
troughs – both in its role as a driving force 
behind the growth of our nation and in 
its success in keeping its workers and 
passengers safe. 
1863 – 1983: The emergence of a 
nationalised rail network 
17 years after the Provincial Government 
created the 7km Christchurch-Ferrymead 
link, the network had grown to 1,900km 
and New Zealand Railways, the national 
rail provider, was created. By 1920 
railways ran the length of the country and 
carried 28 million passengers per year - 
in a country with a population of only a 
million.  
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Railway safety is just one of many areas 
in New Zealand where a goal-based 
approach has been adopted. Goal-based 
safety regulation offers the potential 
to provide organisations with more 
flexibility in meeting their obligations. 
It contrasts with prescriptive-based 
regulation, where government seeks to 
manage risks on industry’s behalf, not 
necessarily more reliably, by voluminous 
and continually growing instruction on 
safety requirements (Robens, 1972). 
Regulators are fast building the 
skillsets required in response to this 
change in regulatory practice, supported 
by cross-government capability building 
initiatives such as G-Reg. However, as the 
Transport Agency has found, the change 
is not just about new skills. It is about 
transformational change to enable 
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As the network continued to grow, the 
safety systems required to manage it grew 
as well. Rail is an activity exposed to low 
frequency, high consequence accidents – 
movement of large objects at speed has 
always meant a complex system of 
controls are required to prevent fatalities. 
Vulnerabilities have been learnt the hard 
way in some cases (see Table 1). 
The national rail provider took a 
strong, but prescriptive approach to safety 
– as all industries of the day did. It created 
a quality management system based on an 
ever expanding mountain of rules, policies 
and schematics to dictate safety. 
By the 1950s, rail was starting to 
decline in popularity as a series of shocks 
hit the industry. The widespread uptake 
of motor cars cut passenger numbers, and 
deregulation in the 1970s and 1980s saw a 
considerable move of freight tonnage to 
road. New Zealand Rail had been a 
government department for most of its 
existence but, struggling to cope with 
these shocks, was turned into a State 
Owned Enterprise in 1982 in an attempt 
to turn the industry around. 
1983 – 2005: A struggling system  
Government efforts to cut costs and 
restructure to address rail’s profitability 
ultimately culminated in the sale of 
the national rail provider to a private 
consortium in 1993. Staff numbers, 
peaking at 21,000 in 1982, had dropped to 
below 5,000 by this stage.
The following decade was one of the 
hardest in New Zealand rail’s history as 
ownership and investment drifted. The 
business was renamed Tranz Rail and 
subject to aggressive profit strategies. 
Former Treasury official John Wilson 
(Wilson, 2010) wrote that, by 2001:  
Tranz Rail’s financial problems were 
now creating visible shortfalls in the 
capital asset replacement programme
The prescriptive-based safety system 
strained with the pressures of rapid 
downsizing, asset deterioration and 
increased production. Prescriptive-based 
regulatory approaches give a sense of 
security because they are comparatively 
simple to confirm compliance. However, 
whether this compliance achieves safety is 
more difficult to confirm – changing 
circumstances, such as railways saw over 
those two decades, can easily destroy this 
link.  
After five Tranz Rail workers died in a 
7 month period (a fatality rate eight times 
higher than the national worker average) 
the Wilson Ministerial Inquiry was 
initiated (New Zealand Government, 
2000; Williams, 2000). The Wilson 
Ministerial Inquiry identified 
fundamental flaws in the railways 
regulatory approach.
the number of [safety system] 
documents is in the range of 1,000 to 
2,000 and the number of drawings is 
in the region of 100,000. It would 
appear that the scale of 
documentation is unmanageable 
relative to the aim of securing a safe 
system … The sheer extent and 
coverage of the [regulator] Approved 
Safety System renders it unwieldly 
and probably impenetrable to outside 
observers. (New Zealand 
Government, 2000, p.23)
This echoes the findings of a seminal 
1972 inquiry of worker health and safety 
by Lord Robens in the United Kingdom. 
Robens proposed focusing on the level of 
safety that must be achieved (the “goal”), 
rather than how it was achieved (Robens, 
1972).  He foresaw prescriptive regulation 
was fatally flawed in that, as complexities 
grew, it would unacceptably throttle safety 
improvements. Businesses wouldn’t be 
able to exploit safety advances or adopt 
customised approaches. 
Post 2005: The way forward?
In 2005, Railways Act came into force, 
regulating an industry that was far 
different to that of the previous 140 
years. Although the national rail provider 
returned to government ownership, 
its staff numbers were down to 3,500 
and it operated a network of only 3,700 
km (from a peak, 50 years earlier, of 
5,689km). However, the wider industry 
had proliferated - today there are about 
100 licensed rail participants using a huge 
variety of rail vehicles for commuting, 
freight, servicing, tourist and heritage 
purposes. 
The commentary for the Railways Act 
did not identify it as a goal-based 
approach, but the principles were there. 
The Select Committee sought to enable a 
co-regulatory framework and flexibility in 
how safety requirements were met, and 
the Act imposed an overarching duty of 
care for all rail activities, primarily that 
the operator:
.. must ensure, so far as is reasonably 
practicable, that none of the rail 
activities for which it is responsible 
causes, or is likely to cause, the death 
of, or serious injury to, individuals.
The Act put in place a bespoke 
regulator that oversees a licensing regime 
for those operating rail vehicles or 
controlling a network. To obtain a licence, 
operators must have a Safety Case 
approved by the regulator. The regulator 
has powers to conduct in-depth system 
assessments of the operator to verify 
compliance with the Safety Case and other 
safety documentation. The Act allows the 
regulator to intervene more directly if 
Table 1: Disasters in New Zealand’s early rail history
Year Location Fatalities Event
1923 Ongarue 17 Auckland to Wellington passenger service hit 
landslide and derailed 
1936 Ratana 7 Wellington to New Plymouth passenger service 
overturned due to excessive speed on a corner
1943 Hyde 21 Cromwell to Dunedin passenger service 
overturned due to excessive speed on a corner
1948 Seddon 6 Picton to Christchurch passenger service 
overturned due to excessive speed on a corner
1953 Tangiwai 151 Wellington to Auckland passenger service fell 
into the Whangaehu River after a lahar sweeps 
away the bridge
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there are immediate safety risks or if non-
compliances are detected. 
However, the decade following the 
enactment of the Railways Act 2005 
demonstrated the difficulty in applying a 
goal-based approach on a deeply 
established industry without sufficient 
appreciation of the change it entailed. The 
potential of the approach was not fully 
recognised and the regulator was under-
prepared to deliver the altered style and 
thinking required to fully exploit it. 
Particularly, the oversight of Safety Cases, 
a powerful tool for implementing a goal-
based regime (see boxed text “What is a 
Safety Case?”) was under-utilised. Instead, 
a process-based operating model was 
adopted that focused heavily on 
mechanically auditing activities across all 
operators.
Recognising the need for transformation
Following the Wilson Inquiry and passing 
of the new Act, railway deaths and serious 
injuries significantly reduced but, as 
has been found before, the absence of 
accidents is not proof of safety. There was 
uncertainty over the role of the regulator 
and the robustness of safety protections. 
Change was needed, and the railway 
industry was fortunate in that its impetus 
for this change did not come from a 
catastrophic accident, but as part of a 
general push towards improved regulatory 
services by  the Transport Agency, the 
industry and other government agencies, 
particularly in the wake of regulatory 
failures such as the 2010 Pike River Mining 
Disaster. 
A number of internal and independent 
reports helped the Transport Agency 
understand where the gaps lay and became 
the catalyst for a multi-year improvement 
project that is still underway. In particular, 
a report by Australasian Transport Risk 
Solutions (2013) made 18 observations 
and commented:
...  there is considerable room for 
improvement. This conclusion is 
based on the results of the 
international benchmarking analysis, 
feedback received from the 
stakeholders, and evidence found by 
the review team which suggests that 
the current administrative and 
support arrangements within NZTA 
for such a safety critical independent 
rail safety regulator function to be less 
than an acceptable standard. 
(Australasian Transport Risk 
Solutions, 2013, p.5)
The various reviews recommended a 
series of tactical changes, such as elevating 
the regulator in the Transport Agency 
hierarchy, increasing regulatory staff 
numbers, broadening the skill-base and 
performing greater analysis. However 
none, including the Wilson Inquiry, 
explicitly highlighted the need to move to 
a goal-based culture or the challenges this 
would entail. 
It was only once the Transport Agency, 
while implementing these tactical 
changes, reflected more deeply on the core 
drivers for the problems these reviews 
highlighted that it began to recognise that 
moving to a goal-based regime in rail 
safety and delivering the required standard 
of regulatory service was a more 
fundamental shift.
A dramatic shift in the regulatory 
framework, from a prescriptive to a goal 
basis, can have a disorientating impact on 
the regulators and the regulated if not 
recognised and can, ultimately, lead to 
regulatory failure (Mumford, 2011; Black, 
2014). For instance, New Zealand’s leaky 
building crisis was partially attributed to 
such a change. Mumford (2011) noted that 
What is a Safety Case?
Safety Cases originated in the nuclear power industry in the late 1950s but their 
potential value for other high-risk, specialised industries was recognised after  
accidents in the chemical industry (particularly Flixborough in 1974 and Seveso 
in 1976) and then more widely after the Cullen Inquiry into the 1988 Piper 
Alpha explosion.  
Principles of Safety Cases
Safety Cases are based on three principles common to most goal-based ap-
proaches (Leveson, 2011). 
•	 Risks	must	be	reduced	below	a	specified	threshold	of	acceptability
•	 Those	who	create	risks	are	responsible	for	controlling	those	risks	
•	 Government	set	safety	goals	and	operators	decide	the	appropriate	methods	to	
achieve those goals
The Safety Case delivers on these principles in a way that allows the regulator 
to focus on what is being achieved rather than how it is being achieved, while still 
providing a degree of assurance as to the quality of the operator’s methods. 
A key element of a Safety Case is that it is an argument, not a summary. An 
argument	convinces	an	audience	of	a	premise	–	in	this	case,	confidence	that	an	
operator can achieve its safety commitments. As with an argument, the rationale in 
a Safety Case must be able to be tested. The United Kingdom’s Defence Standard 
00-56 notes a Safety Case to be:
a structured argument, supported by a body of evidence, that provides a 
compelling, comprehensible and valid case that a system is safe for a given 
application in a given environment.
Because a Safety Case communicates this rationale for how the operator will 
keep safe, it sits apart from the management systems to provide direction and 
integrate them.
When a regulator intervenes in a goal-based approach, it is on the basis 
that the operator has not demonstrated it has developed its approach in a robust 
manner and so is unlikely to be able to meet its goals. The regulator is not critiquing 
the safety approach taken but the method the operator used to determine it. 
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the haste to move away from an expensive 
(if reliable) standards-based approach to a 
more flexible regime resulted in discarding 
previous safeguards without adequate 
consideration of what was replacing them. 
Mumford commented:
New Zealand moved into an 
unknown future while burning the 
bridges to its past.
To be successful, the Transport Agency 
needed to redefine its rail safety role, how 
it engaged with the industry, and how it 
exerted its influence over the industry. 
A cultural change such as this is 
referred to as transformational change. It 
fundamentally alters the strategy by which 
an organisation achieves its objective. 
Existing skills, behaviours and approaches 
are no longer suitable and have to be 
adapted, enhanced or replaced 
(Cummings and Worley, 2009; New 
Zealand Productivity Commission, 2014). 
The national rail provider was also 
going through its own transformational 
change. Along with a heavy period of asset 
renewal and developing new safety 
approaches, it was exploring its role as 
manager of the national rail system under 
such a regulatory framework. A particular 
challenge for it was reconciling how its 
safety outcomes related to those of the 
operators under its supervision on the 
network.
Smaller operators, on the other hand, 
experienced difficulties in maintaining 
the competencies and documentation to 
comply with a regulatory framework 
more often applied to multi-national, 
high-risk industries than small hobbyist. 
They were still looking for clear, 
prescriptive expectations from the 
regulator as to how to be compliant with 
the safety requirements rather than 
moving into a goal-based mind-set.   
Regulator and regulated alike were 
struggling to understand their respective 
responsibilities and approaches to 
meeting those responsibilities in a goal-
based regulatory framework.
Making the changes
The Transport Agency took a learning, 
highly adaptive approach to its rail safety 
transformational change, rather than 
implementing a pre-planned strategy. This 
reflected that the transformational nature 
of the change was only gradually recognised 
after the simpler, task-driven change 
programme had been begun. In addition, 
with the rail industry going through parallel 
changes, the approach needed flexibility to 
navigate a shifting environment.   
In addition, the change was relatively 
compartmentalised within the wider 
Transport Agency. It sought direction 
from the senior leadership and values of 
the organisation, but it only had a 
transformational impact on a small 
number of teams who had direct roles in 
enabling a goal-based approach to rail 
safety. Achieving the change did not 
require a whole-of-organisation shift. As a 
result, although the changes were deep, 
they were narrow and more manageable.
Successful change required two 
significant perceptual changes to be made. 
Roles in the regulatory framework
To understand its role in the regulatory 
framework, the Transport Agency had to 
understand what it meant for the operator 
to own the risks of its activities – a 
concept that felt contrary to the regulatory 
role. Regulation is enacted to provide 
assurance that the risks that society finds 
unacceptable are addressed (New Zealand 
Productivity Commission, 2014). It is the 
responsibility of the regulator to provide 
this assurance, and it is therefore natural for 
a regulator to feel most comfortable when 
meeting this duty directly by controlling 
the risk itself (for instance, by approving 
safety measures) rather than entrusting 
management of the risks to the operator. 
The challenge became for the Transport 
Agency to let go of this role and meet its 
duty through more indirect methods.  
Some in the industry were coming to 
the same conclusion. The rail industry had 
been challenging themselves and the 
Transport Agency as to where 
responsibilities and accountabilities lay for 
safety, and what tools could support clearer 
accountabilities and allow the regulator to 
have confidence the industry would deliver 
on their safety commitments. 
To enable such an approach, some 
regulatory tools, such as the Safety Case, 
needed to be recognised as being of equal, 
or greater, value to the industry than the 
The New Zealand Rail Industry  
in 2017
6,200 workers are employed by, or volunteer for, licensed rail participants in New 
Zealand. Many of these workers are proud to be from a long lineage of rail work-
ers, have known rail all their lives and have seen a number of structural models 
come and go. The industry carries 34 million passengers and 18 million tonnes 
of freight every year, across 4,260km of rail network, on everything from brand-
new commuter fleets to hand-restored museum pieces. Those licensed to operate 
railways include:
•	 KiwiRail,	a	State	Owned	Enterprise	that	employs	3,700	staff.	As	the	national	
rail provider, it controls and maintains the 3,744km national rail network and 
operates all national freight and passenger services.
•	 Transdev	Auckland	and	Transdev	Wellington	operate	the	two	metropolitan	
commuter services, carrying 32 million passengers every year. 
•	 Industrial	businesses	utilising	rail	to	load	and	move	freight	on	their	sites	or	to	
service their infrastructure.
•	 Tourist	and	Heritage	services	operating	rail	services	to	showcase	rail	his-
tory and/or provide tourist experiences. Running excursions on the national 
network or their own railways, they operate a huge range of vehicles including 
full-sized heritage locomotives, trams, cable-cars, custom-built rail cars and 
modified	golf-carts.
In addition to this, more than 200 organisations operate rail vehicles under  
others’ licences, to provide vehicle and infrastructure maintenance services. 
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regulator – a fact commented on by Lord 
Cullen in the Piper Alpha Inquiry. 
Haddon-Cave (2009) paraphrased his 
observations, noting that the purpose of 
Safety Cases was: 
to assure [the company] that its 
operations were safe ... Whilst the 
Safety Case had a further role in 
demonstrating this to the regulatory 
body, this latter function was a matter 
of only secondary importance. 
(p.166)
Becoming a risk-based regulator
With the focus on high-level outcomes, 
moving to a goal-based approach facilitates 
the Transport Agency in becoming a 
risk-based regulator, as expected of all 
agencies (New Zealand Government, 
2017). Previously the Transport Agency 
had taken an across-the-board approach 
to oversight, working across all areas of 
harm and pursuing serious issues as they 
arose. This was an ineffective approach 
(Sparrow, 2008; Baldwin and Black, 2007) 
as it spread Transport Agency resources 
too thinly and intervention was too 
transient to have lasting effect. 
Again, this challenge can generate 
uneasiness. Becoming a risk-based 
regulator means consciously de-
prioritising other potential sources of 
harm. These sources of harm may still be 
important, but just not as important as 
others. In addition, there is uncertainty in 
decisions as to where the greatest risk is. 
The result is it places a great deal of 
responsibility on the regulator - what if 
the Transport Agency makes the wrong 
choice and it is a different risk that leads 
to the next catastrophic accident? Being 
clear about the evidence base (and 
limitations of it) and each party’s 
accountabilities in respect of the targeted 
risks and general risks helps move beyond 
the inertia this can cause.
Reflecting these changes through Safety 
Cases
The Transport Agency’s re-positioning 
of the Safety Case’s role in the regulatory 
framework has been a core outcome of 
the change process. Better utilisation of 
this tool is both reflecting and driving 
many of the changed perspectives within 
the Transport Agency and the industry. 
The Transport Agency has gained several 
insights regarding its regulatory role and 
being a risk-based regulator through 
focusing on this tool. 
These insights are similar to many 
other industries’ experiences with Safety 
Cases, such as the Nimrod mid-air 
explosion (see boxed text), the Gulf Oil 
disaster (United States, 2011) and as 
surveyed by the United Kingdom Health 
and Safety Executive (Vectra Group 
Limited, 2003). 
 
Avoid owning the risk
A Safety Case doesn’t work well when 
used in a prescriptive way. The natural 
tendency is for an operator to describe 
how it is managing its safety. However, 
when a Safety Case descends into nothing 
more than a summary of how the safety 
measures are being carried out, all it offers 
is paper safety. 
Safety Cases, in particular, require 
discipline by the Transport Agency to 
maintain its regulatory role by following 
goal-based principles and resist using its 
rail technical expertise to double-check 
the operator has chosen the appropriate 
safety approach. Instead, to ensure that an 
operator owns the risks of its activities, 
approval needs to be based on the strength 
of the operator’s argument. 
A consequence of this is that the 
regulator requires broad, rather than 
deep, expertise to assess a Safety Case. 
Rather than relying solely on rail and 
safety expertise, to critique the argument 
the Transport Agency staff also have to 
have expertise in such aspects as change 
management, assurance, safety systems 
and governance. 
Underpin trust with evidence
In the traditional use of Safety Cases for 
heavy equipment installations, the Safety 
Case provides confidence by providing 
direct evidence of safety. However, for an 
The RAF Nimrod mid-air explosion 
The Haddon-Cave inquiry (Haddon-Cave, 2009)  into the loss 14 aircrew after 
British Royal Air Force (RAF) Nimrod XV230 exploded in mid-air serves as one 
of the most well examined and illustrative studies of the potential weaknesses of 
Safety Cases. 
The report made 12 observations, which included the following failures of the 
Safety Case process at the RAF
1. Safety Cases had become too long, bureaucratic and contained impenetrable 
detail, often simply to give a “thud factor”.
2. Safety Cases gave equal attention to minor hazards as they did catastrophic 
hazards.
3.	 Safety	Cases	were	routinely	outsourced	and	reduced	to	mere	back-office	
paperwork with little appreciation or personal interest in the subject of the 
Safety Case.
4. Safety Cases were a compliance document that looked for evidence to justify a 
predetermined answer that the system is safe, rather than look for evidence as 
to why it might not be. 
5. Safety Cases were “shelfware”, rather than living documents to keep abreast 
of hazards and cultural changes. 
Haddon-Cave commented: 
	 The	Nimrod	Safety	Case	was	a	lamentable	job	from	start	to	finish.	It	was	
riddled with errors… Its production is a story of incompetence, complacency 
and cynicism… The best opportunity to prevent the accident to XV230 was, 
tragically, lost.
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organisational Safety Case like in railways, 
such definitive evidence is not available - 
particularly when first licensed. 
But rather than requiring blind trust, 
the Safety Case provides the Transport 
Agency with a framework to structure its 
confidence around – a robust and 
evidenced argument, embedded in the 
organisation, that the operator will 
achieve its safety commitments (see 
Figure 1).
This allows the Transport Agency to 
better understand the value-add of its 
role. Its engagement with operators is 
about building confidence in the Safety 
Case argument, rather than approving the 
safety system approach.
As an example, approval of Safety 
Cases involves site visits. Previously, the 
operator may have thought (rightly or 
wrongly) that the Transport Agency was 
approving its specific safety activities. 
However, the Transport Agency visits not 
as auditors but to gain evidence for a 
more subjective judgement as to whether 
the operator’s safety argument stands up 
and it will achieve its safety commitments. 
Regulatory staff may still observe the 
adequacy of a rail vehicle or the network 
control approach, but as part of building 
a picture of the organisational 
competence, along with their 
observations of more general aspects 
such as integration, communication and 
capability. 
A framework-based approach also 
helps the industry understand they have 
to earn that trust – it’s not just a case of 
“hands-off regulation”.
Simplify but don’t compromise safety cases 
The Railways Act has imposed a 
sophisticated regulatory approach over an 
industry that includes operators with only 
basic competencies and comparatively 
low risks. The original users of Safety 
Case approaches were high risk, heavily 
resourced and complex operators – such 
as nuclear, chemical and extractives 
industry. Parts of the rail industry are, 
in contrast, hobbyists. This challenge 
has been observed in other sectors where 
Safety Cases or similar tools have been 
applied homogeneously over a diverse 
industry (Deighton-Smith, 2008).
Some rail operators may have the right 
approaches and culture in place, but 
struggle to join them up as a system and 
demonstrate it on paper. An operator may 
simply not have the competency to 
develop bespoke safety solutions and so 
rely on standard industry practices. It can 
be argued that a more prescriptive 
approach should be applied to such 
operators (Deighton-Smith, 2008). 
However, the Transport Agency is 
confident that, given these operators still 
face complex risks, the flexibility and 
safety-focus of a goal-based approach 
remains more effective.  In essence, a good 
Safety Case is as simple as proving an 
organisation can make good decisions.
Focusing its efforts according to risk, 
the Transport Agency is looking towards 
pragmatic solutions that simplify 
requirements without losing the core 
principles of Safety Cases. This is not 
about turning the Safety Case back into a 
safety system summary or providing 
detailed templates that result in a paint-
by-numbers exercise. The Safety Case still 
has to demonstrate the operator’s own 
safety argument for it to have any value. 
Conclusions
The move away from prescriptive 
regulation to the effective use of goal-
based tools such as Safety Cases has both 
empowered and challenged the Transport 
Agency to better carry out its role in 
achieving the Government’s objectives for 
rail safety. To be successful it had to 
recognise that the transition is not just a 
matter of better regulatory practice, but 
organisational transformation – for both 
the regulator and the regulated. 
The Transport Agency is still 
undergoing this journey, but is already 
recognising important lessons: 
1. The move to goal-based legislative 
approaches is positive for safety, but 
the cultural shift required should not 
be underestimated – transformational 
change approaches should be adopted 
and a learning environment 
encouraged.
2. The industry needs to be involved – it 
is not something the regulator does 
behind closed doors.
3. As a cultural shift, the change has to 
be deep but it can be achieved 
through a focus on the critical 
regulatory staff, rather than 
organisation wide. 
4. Being a goal-based regulator is an 
uneasy experience – assurance of 
safety is based on trust (underpinned 
with evidence) in the capability and 
willingness of the regulated party, 
rather than having the ability to 
dictate the “right” solution.
5. Goal-based regulatory approaches 
support the transition towards 
Context
Confidence
Confirmation
Commitment
• Have they made measurable safety commitments?
• Have they set clear accountabilities for these commitments?
• Have they demonstrated that they understand the context they 
will operate in – particularly the risks and barriers to achieving 
their commitments?
• Do they make a robust argument that their management 
systems can achieve safety commitments? 
• Have they demonstrated that they have the determination, 
capability and capacity to carry out their safety activities?
• Are there the hallmarks of a strong safety culture?
• Can they justify their decisions?
• Is safety awareness widely embedded?
• Are there any warning bells?
Figure 1: The Safety Case providing a trust framework
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risk-based regulation by stressing the 
operator’s overall accountability for 
their risks and allowing the regulator 
to focus on the high-level outcomes. 
Safety Cases and goal-based legislation 
are not an automatic panacea to 
organisational safety. Various inquiries, 
surveys and the Transport Agency’s own 
experiences have highlighted that a 
cultural transformation among the 
regulator and the regulated community is 
what enhances safety. A Safety Case helps 
demonstrate this has been achieved – it 
doesn’t create it. As Lord Cullen 
commented (Jeffrey 2013):
A Safety Case should reflect the 
organisation’s safety culture. If that 
culture is sound and healthy – it 
should show.
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School of Government Brown 
Bag seminars – open to all
Join lively, topical presentations and 
discussions in an informal setting at the 
School of Government. These Brown Bag 
sessions are held the first Monday of most 
months, over lunchtime. Past topics have 
included: 
•	 Intergenerational	wellbeing	and	public	
policy 
•	 A	visual	exploration	of	video	
surveillance camera policy  
and practice 
•	 The	role	of	financial	risk	in	the	New	
Zealand Primary Health Care Strategy 
•	 Strategic	public	procurement:	a	
research agenda 
•	 What	role(s)	for	Local	Government:	
‘roads,	rates	and	rubbish’	or	‘partner	
in	governance’?	
•	 Human	capital	theory:	the	end	of	a	
research	programme?
•	 How	do	we	do	things?
We	would	welcome	your	attendance	
and/or guest presentation, if you are 
interested.
Contact us to go on the mailing list for upcoming sessions at  
sog-info@vuw.ac.nz
